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11 Introduction
In a recent paper Jackson and Sonnenschein (2005) demonstrate how the limitations that
incentive constraints impose on the attainment of socially desirable outcomes can be over-
come when independent social decision problems are linked. They propose to \ration" or
\budget" the agents' representations in accordance with their empirical distribution. Im-
posing those budgets increases e±ciency of the outcomes as compared to deciding on each
problem separately since it allows to ask the players the question: \which decision do you
care more about?" Let us illustrate this point with an example.
Consider coalition talks between two parties. In the course of the negotiations, agree-
ments on a variety of topics have to be reached. From a social point of view, for each single
decision it would be desirable if the party succeeded that cares more about the issue.1 As-
sume that it is publicly known that each party is equally likely to care a lot, or a little
about each single issue on the table.2 If, however, only the parties themselves know their
preferences exactly, they have an incentive to pretend to assign high importance to every
single issue in order to a®ect the result of the negotiations in their favor. A budget in the
sense of Jackson and Sonnenschein would restrict both sides to state a high importance for
only half of the issues that are negotiated. The parties then have an incentive to utilize their
budget ¯rst on issues that are indeed important to them, until the budget is exhausted.
The example also demonstrates an obvious di±culty that arises at implementation.
Institutions would be needed in order to implement and enforce a budget. While two
parties involved in coalition talks might ex-ante agree on procedures that e®ectively result
in budgeting, in many situations, such institutions do not exist and are di±cult to establish.
Moreover, players do not only have an incentive to lie concerning their types, but concerning
their distribution of types: By claiming that they care a lot about almost everything that
is being decided they could achieve a more favorable budget, which complicates the ex-ante
1We assume for simplicity of exposition that the parties' preferences coincide with those of their voters.
Furthermore, we assume that the utilities of voters are comparable and that the number of voters for each
party is about equal. Otherwise, the smaller party's preference should only be implemented if it cares
substantially more about the issue than the larger party.
2This is, of course, oversimpli¯ed but it facilitates to make our point.
2agreement on institutions that enable budgeting.
However, in practice economic agents are usually aware that they can only exploit
bene¯ts (i.e. e±ciency gains) in a stable relationship if they do not upset their counterpart
by overweighing their own interest. Thus, social interaction could lead to endogenous
budgets that are enforced by the threat of retaliation. One of the problems that come with
the induced endogenous budget is that perception of compliance to such a virtual budget
need not be the same on the two sides of the market, as we will show in our paper.
In this paper, we compare the e®ectiveness of the exogenous budgets proposed by Jack-
son and Sonnenschein with various forms of social interaction that have the potential to
imply an endogenous budget. In particular, we study stable partnerships, reputation build-
ing and competition for partners. We ¯nd that exogenous budgets help players to reap
almost all achievable e±ciency gains. Among the social interaction treatments, only com-
petition for partners leads to a signi¯cant increase in truthful representation of preferences
and e±ciency. Two control treatments serve to assess possible explanations for the rel-
atively low e®ectiveness of social interaction. The ambiguity of signals does not appear
to be crucial. In contrast, the coordination problem in the sense that all involved players
should understand how to reap the e±ciency gains and need to implicitly agree on a budget,
seems to be of major importance. Competition for partners enables players to reduce this
problem.
Our paper is related to three areas in recent literature. The paper by Jackson and
Sonnenschein was inspired and generalizes the storable votes idea of Casella (2005). Casella,
Gelman and Palfrey (2003) study the storable votes mechanism experimentally and ¯nd
that players make e®ective use of the opportunity to store votes. Even though equilibrium
strategies are di±cult to compute, realized e±ciency levels are very close to the theoretical
prediction. Hortala-Vallve (2004a) generalizes the storable votes mechanism to \qualitative
voting", which allows players to freely allocate votes across decisions. He also assumes that
they are informed about the intensity of their preferences concerning all decisions from
the start. In Hortala-Vallve (2004b) he presents experimental support that subjects vote
in accordance with the equilibrium predictions and that qualitative voting achieves the
e±cient outcome signi¯cantly more often than majority voting. These results are well in
line with our result on the e®ectiveness of the Jackson-Sonnenschein mechanism. Kaplan
3and Ru²e (2005) study a market-entry game with private information. In contrast to our
results, they ¯nd that players coordinate well on e±cient cut-o® strategies. The e®ects of
competition for partners in trust games is studied by Tyran, Huck, and Ruchala (2005). In
line with our results, they ¯nd that competition increases trustworthiness beyond the level
achieved through reputation building alone.3
2 An Experiment on Linking Decisions
In section 2.1 we present a slightly modi¯ed version of one of Jackson and Sonnenschein's
(2005) examples (in order to illustrate their point), and introduce two experimental treat-
ments that shall evaluate the empirical relevance of the incentive problem and the e®ective-
ness of the Jackson-Sonnenschein mechanism. Then, in section 2.2, we argue that also social
interaction might solve the problem by implementing an endogenous budget. We illustrate
that players have an incentive to cooperate in order to realize (and share) e±ciency gains
and propose three treatments that imply di®erent incentives to do so.
2.1 The Idea of Exogenous Budgets
Suppose that two players, a and b, are engaged in a joint project. It is common knowledge
that the players always disagree on the version of the project to be chosen. Let us call
the version preferred by player a version a, and the version preferred by player b version b.
Each player receives a positive payo® only if his preferred version of the project is chosen.
A player's intensity of preference for his preferred version, however, is private information.
The intensity can either be strong (s) or weak (w), where s > w. Both cases are equally
likely.4
Now suppose that a social planner wants to choose the version of the project that
3Coricello, Fehr, and Fellner (2003) study partner selection in public good experiments. Interestingly,
the contribution levels are highest for unidirectional partner selection. Hauk and Nagel (2001) ¯nd similar
results in a prisoner's dilemma experiment.
4The intensity of preferences corresponds to the payo® received if the agent's preferred version is chosen.
In the experiment we consider the case that s = 2w.
4maximizes the sum of the utilities. If the intensity of preferences is the same for both players,
the social planner is indi®erent which version to choose and can °ip a coin. Otherwise, he
wants to choose the version preferred by the player with the stronger intensity of preference.




player b's preference w coin a
s b coin
Table 1: E±cient social choice function
The problem with this social choice function is, however, that it is not incentive compat-
ible. That is, if it is applied to the players' stated preferences, it is each player's dominant
strategy to always state a strong preference, whatever preference he observed. The closest
social choice function that can be implemented through an incentive compatible mechanism
is illustrated in Table 2.
player a states
w s
player b states w coin coin
s coin coin
Table 2: Incentive Compatible Mechanism
Note that under this social choice function the version is always determined by a °ip of a
coin, independently of the preferences stated by the two players.5 This social choice function
is ex{post Pareto e±cient, but not ex{ante. The reason is that once players have observed
5In case both players might prefer the same version with some probability, the mechanism would be
extended to simply voting on the version to be executed, without taking into account the intensities of
preferences and °ipping a coin whenever the agents disagree. In the experiment we only consider the case
where the players disagree.
5their stated preferences it is not possible to write a contract that improves the situation of
both players. Ex{ante, however, this is possible. The linking mechanism exploits this fact.
Linking two independent decisions Now consider the case that the two players have to
decide on two independent problems simultaneously. First, note that if players separately
vote over the two problems, what was ex{ante Pareto ine±ciency in the single decision
problem becomes ex{post ine±ciency in the situation where players decide simultaneously
on two problems. To see this, consider the case that each player has one strong and one
weak preference and that player a's preference is strong for the ¯rst project whereas player
b's preference is strong for the second one. Now, if for the ¯rst project player b's version
is chosen and for the second project player a's, then, even ex{post, players would bene¯t
from turning around the decision.
Jackson and Sonnenschein propose the following mechanism that links the two prob-
lems. When stating preference intensities for the two (independent) projects, each player is
allowed to state a strong preference only once. The ex{ante e±cient social choice function
is then applied to the constrained announcements. Jackson and Sonnenschein show that
there is a Bayesian equilibrium of their mechanism with the following features:
² If an agent's intensity of preference di®ers across the two problems then he or she
announces truthfully
² If an agent has two preference intensities of the same magnitude, then the agent
randomly chooses which problem to announce the strong preference for.
Although the equilibria of the linked mechanism are not Pareto e±cient(neither ex{ante nor
ex{post), the equilibrium outcomes still Pareto dominate from any perspective (ex{ante,
interim, or ex{post) voting on the problems separately. The reason is that linking two
problems allows to ask the players the question \Which decision do you care more about?"
Jackson and Sonnenschein (2005) show that linking more decisions helps further, and in
the limit their mechanism leads to full Pareto e±ciency.
As a ¯rst step of our experiment, we establish that the problem analyzed by Jackson and
Sonnenschein is indeed empirically relevant, i. e. experimental subjects follow the incentives
6to overstate their preferences, and whether it can be satisfactorily solved by the mechanism
they propose. For this purpose we run two treatments:
Treatment I: Random Matching (RAN). In this treatment, we test whether
in an environment without any incentive to be honest, honesty indeed breaks down.
Subjects are randomly rematched in pairs within a relatively large group (8 sub-
jects) without any opportunity for identi¯cation and hence no opportunity to build a
reputation for honesty that could either be reciprocated or attract new partners.
Treatment II: Exogenous Budgets (EXO). In this treatment subjects were also
rematched randomly, as in the previous treatment. However, each subject faced a
budget corresponding to the expected distribution of preferences, that is, he could
state at most 20 strong preferences over the 40 periods that the experiment lasted.6
2.2 Can Budgets Arise Endogenously?
In the following we will argue that di®erent forms of social interaction that allow for the
formation of long-term partnerships or reputation building may | to a di®erent extent
| be capable of promoting cooperation among players by endogenously creating a need
to budget stated preferences. Since a player cannot assess the other's honesty directly,
any conditionally cooperative strategy can only be based on the distribution of the other's
stated preferences. Hence if one player follows a conditionally cooperative strategy, this
implies that the other player needs to budget his stated preferences, independent of his real
preferences. Obviously, it is required that decisions are sequential for a player to be able
to reciprocate violations of the budget,7 whereas an exogenous budget can be applied to
several decisions that are made simultaneously as well as to those made sequentially.
A possible conditionally cooperative strategy that players might follow would be
\stochastic tit{for{tat", i.e. switching to stating always strong preferences in the next m
periods if the other player has stated more than n < m strong preferences in the last m
6We did not limit the number of weak preferences that could be stated, as a rational player should
always exploit his budget for strong preferences completely. Indeed, almost all subjects did.
7To be more precise, several decisions can be made simultaneously as long as these are repeated.
7periods. Another possible, highly sophisticated strategy would be \binomial trigger", i.e.
switching to always stating a strong preference once a binomial test applied to the other
player's sequence of stated preferences allows him to reject the hypothesis that this sequence
is random at some pre-determined level. This already points to a problem of endogeniz-
ing budgets. In order to know his own budget, a player needs to know the other player's
strategy.8
In order to illustrate the possible bene¯ts from linking decisions (either through exoge-
nous budgets or through conditionally cooperative behavior), we now present the possible
e±ciency gains from honest behavior as compared to (stage-game Nash-)equilibrium play.
This is what the agents could distribute among themselves if they coordinated on truthful
behavior. Suppose (analogously to the choice of parameters in our experimental setting)
that the two preference intensities satisfy s = 2w. Denote by EU(x;y) an agent's expected
payo® from behavior x if the other plays y, x;y 2 fh;s;wg, where h stands for honest
behavior, and s (w) for always reporting strong (weak) preferences. The expected payo®s
are displayed in Table 3, for the computations see the appendix.














Table 3: Payo®s from being honest, tough, and nice.
As it turns out, honest play by both agents increases the expected total payo® by
approximately 16.7 %, relative to the (stage-game) equilibrium payo®. However, if the
other player is always reporting honestly, the incentive for one player to always state a
strong preference is higher than the e±ciency gain from mutual honest behavior (i. e. it
raises his payo® by 28.6 % compared to being honest as well). Finally, observe that given
8On the other hand, recall that exogenous budgeting forces the agents to lie if their true distribution of
preference intensities does not perfectly match the underlying distribution. Thus, since endogenous budgets
can have more °exibility, it is in principle even possible that they outperform exogenous ones.
8the other player always reports a strong preference, doing the same even increases the
player's payo® by 50 % compared to honest behavior.
As we argued above, social interaction might allow players to endogenize a budget for
their representation of preferences and thus to overcome the incentive constraints. The sec-
ond aim of our study is to investigate whether subjects manage to realize potential e±ciency
gains without exogenous budgeting if (a) they interact repeatedly, (b) the environment of-
fers the chance to build a reputation, or (c) they have to compete for partners. Speci¯cally,
we consider the following treatments.
Stable Partnerships (FIX). In this treatment, each pair stays together for the
whole course of the experiment. By comparing this to the random matching treatment
(RAN), we can assess to what degree subjects are able to realize the mutual gains from
honesty in a long-term relationship. Reciprocating honesty with honesty increases the
expected payo®s for both subjects (where honesty can only stochastically be detected
via an endogenous budget). In order to facilitate keeping track of past decisions, after
each round bidders observe a summary of the history of the past periods played with
their partner. In particular, they observe announced preferences and the decisions
that were taken within their pair in all preceding periods.
Random Link Formation in Stable Groups: The Scope for Reputation
Building (RLK). In this treatment, subjects interact in ¯xed groups of four, while
partnerships are still only formed by pairs. In each period, from each subject one
link is established to another, randomly selected subject in the group of four. Each
of these links corresponds to one project. Hence each subject can in any particular
period be involved in one to four projects which are independent in terms of valuations
and implementation. That is, for each of the projects in which a subject is involved,
his or her valuation is independently drawn. If there is a link from subject 1 to
subject 2 and a link from subject 2 to subject 1, these are two independent projects.
After being informed about all the projects to be executed in their group and about
their respective valuations for each of the projects they are involved in, all subjects
simultaneously state their preferences for all projects they are involved in.
At the end of each period all subjects are informed about all stated preferences and
9implemented project versions in their group. Then they are shown a screen with the
history of all stated preferences of all players in their groups. This treatment allows
for reputation building in a more complicated setting than a simple ¯xed pairing. In
particular, in addition to direct reciprocation as in the stable partnerships treatment,
this treatment allows also for indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building.9
The speci¯c design of this treatment is necessary to serve as a benchmark for our next
treatment.
Voluntary Link Formation in Stable Groups: Competition for Partnerships
(CMP). This treatment di®ers from the random link formation treatment only in
that the link originating from each subject is not randomly chosen, but is chosen by
the subject. That is, at the ¯rst stage of every period, each subject chooses one of
the other three subjects as a partner for one project. Then, as in the random link
treatment, all subjects are informed about all links and about their (independently
and randomly chosen) preferences concerning the projects they are involved in. They
then choose simultaneously their stated preferences, and implementation and feed-
back is as above in RLK.
By comparing the behavior in this treatment with that in the random link treatment,
we can assess the impact that the competition for partners has on top of the incentives
for reputation building. Being involved in more projects is bene¯cial because the
expected payo® from each single project is nonnegative. This incentive to increase
the number of partnerships could actually result in subjects being even nicer than
the truth and trying to build a reputation of almost always giving in, which in turn
could lead to ine±ciencies. The expected payo® from doing so, however, is rather
low: If the partner is being honest, we have that EU(w;h) = 3
8w (compare Table 3),
whereas the expected payo® is zero, if the other always reports a strong preference.
Thus, always reporting a weak preference would not even pay if the player doubled
the number of his honest partners.
9See Engelmann and Fischbacher (2003) for experimental evidence that many experimental subjects
are indirectly reciprocal and that they also recognize the incentives for strategic reputation building in an
environment where indirect reciprocity is possible.
10As argued above, in the one{shot game it is a dominant strategy to always report a
strong preference. This is also the prediction for each stage game if matching is random
and players cannot identify players they interact(ed) with. Obviously, repeated interaction,
the observability of past actions, and the possibility to select interaction partners a®ect the
nature of equilibria of the game. All games have Nash equilibria that involve cooperative
behavior. Note however, that the threats needed to establish cooperation are not credible
in the treatments FIX and RLK.
An important observation is that in treatment CMP the possibility to choose partners
establishes pair formation and budgeting (for example, but not exclusively with a one{
weak{one{strong budget per period) as a subgame{perfect Nash{equilibrium even for the
¯nitely repeated game. Such an equilibrium requires a strategy to abandon the partner for
the rest of the game (or at least su±ciently long) if he violates his budget. The reason why
cooperation can be established is that the expected gain from being involved in another
project in the last period is higher than the expected gain from overstating a weak preference
in the second to last period.10 Hence each player in such an endogenously formed pair would,
if he has at least one weak preference in the second to last round, state this truthfully. In
case he has only two strong preferences, the expected gain on stating these truthfully11 is
higher than the expected gain from another project in the last period, so he will state his
strong preferences truthfully and lose his partner in the last period. If the horizon is longer
than one period, the total losses from losing the partner in all of these periods are higher
than the immediate gain of stating both preferences as strong (even if they are) and hence
a player will stick to his one{strong{one{weak budget.12
10Since in the last period, each player will state only strong preferences, a project will be won with
probability 1




4w whereas stating a strong
instead of a weak preference increases the probability of receiving a payo® by 1
2 and hence increases the
expected payo® by 1
2w.
11As above we see that it is 1
22w = w.
12If there are two (or more) periods left, a player not only loses the project that originates from his
partner, but his partner would also have no incentive anymore to state his preferences truthfully on the
other project in the second to last period. So the expected gains from stating a second strong preference
are, as above, w, and the expected payo® from the one project in each of the remaining two periods is
11Even though calculating the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is certainly demanding
for the subjects, its logic is fairly obvious. Hence an important reason why subjects may
state a weak preference more frequently in treatment CMP may well be that the opportunity
to attract partners clearly provides additional incentives to appear honest. It can not only
possibly trigger reciprocal honesty but also attract partners and hence increase the number
of projects, which directly increases the expected payo®s.
2.3 Further Details of the Experimental Implementation
In all our treatments, pairs of players had to decide on a joint project as it has been described
section 2.1. In the experiment, a weak (strong) preference corresponded to a payo® of 30
(60) Pence in the case the desired version of the project was chosen. In each period, for each
of a subject's decisions (remember that one subject might have been involved in more than
one decision per period), the intensity of preference was drawn randomly and independently
across decisions, periods, and subjects, where each possible intensity (30 or 60) was equally
likely. In each treatment, 40 periods were played. The payo® was counted directly in UK
pence. At the end of the experiment, the earnings were paid in cash in Pound Sterling.
All experimental sessions were computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999) and were
conducted in the experimental laboratory at Royal Holloway. In each experimental session,
8 to 16 subjects participated. The total number of subjects was 148 (including two control
treatments discussed below). We conducted one session for the treatment with ¯xed pairs
and two for each of the other treatments. See Table 4 for details.
Written instructions were distributed at the beginning of the experiment and subjects
could go through them at their own pace. After subjects had answered a set of control
questions, the key features of the experiment were orally summarized by one of the ex-
perimenters (the same in all sessions). The experiments took between 45 and 120 minutes
23
4w. In contrast, sticking to the budget now leads to an expected payo® from the last two periods of at
least (this assumes that if the other player violates the budget in the second to last period he will also























64 w > 5
2w: So it does not pay to state two strong preferences in the third to last period.
12treatment # subjects in sessions # independent obs.
Random Matching RAN 16, 8 3
Exogenous Budgets EXO 16, 8 3
Stable Partnerships FIX 16 8
Random Links RLK 16, 12 7
Competition CMP 12, 16 7
Table 4: Number of subjects and independent observations for the di®erent experimental
treatments
(including reading the instructions, answering a post-experimental questionnaire and re-
ceiving payments).13 Average earnings ranged from 9.01 (treatment FXI explained below)
to 18.64 (competition treatment) with an overall average of 13.13.14
3 Evaluation of the Data - Preliminaries
3.1 Relevant Measures of Experimental Behavior
There are two important aspects of the data that we can compare between treatments. First,
how do the treatment variations a®ect how honestly subjects represent their preferences?
Second, does this translate into di®erences in e±ciency?
Honesty Rates. We measure how truthfully subjects state their preferences separately
for the case that their true preference is strong or weak. The measures are
Hs =
#truthfully stated strong preferences
#true strong preferences
(1)
13There are remarkable di®erences in the amount of time the experiment itself took. It ranged from
15-20 minutes in the random matching treatment to 60-80 minutes in the competition treatment.
14Note that the large di®erences in average payo®s are not due to much more successful cooperation, but
primarily occur because there are twice as many projects per subject in RLK and CMP than in the other
treatments.
13Hw =
#truthfully stated weak preferences
#true weak preferences
(2)
E±ciency. The e±ciency is measured in expected terms with respect to the random draws
in case of equal stated preferences.
Denote by i and j the two players involved in a project p. Denote the maximum





pg and the minimum







p is the payo® of
player k, k = i;j, if his preferred version of the project is chosen, i.e. the true intensity







p ¤ (1 ¡ Win
i
p) denotes
the in project p actually realized surplus, where Win
i
p is a dummy that is 1 if the preferred
version of player i has been chosen. If both players state di®erent preferences, this is just
equal to the preference of the player who stated the stronger preference.
In case of equal stated preferences, whose preferred version of the project will be chosen
is determined by a random draw. Since we do not want our measure of e±ciency to be
in°uenced by the outcome of this random draw, we consider the expected achieved surplus
(given the preferences drawn and the behavior in the experiment but taking expectations
with respect to the allocation),
E[S
real










p) + (1 ¡ Equalp) ¤ S
real
p ; (3)
where Equalp is a dummy that is 1 if both bidders state equal preferences and 0 otherwise.
Our measure for e±ciency is then given by the (expected) increase in payo® over the
minimum possible payo® that the players achieve, relative to the maximum possible increase
they could possibly achieve. We call this measure the expected e±ciency,
E[Ep] =
E[Sreal






This measure is then una®ected by the outcome of the random draw which takes place if
both players state equal preferences.
For a single project, the denominator will be zero if both players have the same true
preference, so the expected e±ciency would not be properly de¯ned. We will, however,
only consider aggregate measures (across periods), such that this problem does not occur
in practice. Expected e±ciency will be computed based on aggregates, i. e. we ¯rst sum












Note that if bidders always state their preferences truthfully, then E[E] = 1 and if they




1. Hw(RAN) ¼ 0; Hs(RAN) ¼ 1; E[E] ¼ 1
2:
In treatment I, random matching (RAN), subjects are expected to overwhelmingly
state a strong preference and that this rate approaches 100%. Expected E±ciency
should hence be close to the minimum.
2. Hw(EXO) ¼ 1; Hs(EXO) ¼ 1; E[E] ¼ 1.
In treatment II, exogenous budgets (EXO), subjects are expected to represent their
preferences overwhelmingly honestly, in particular after some initial learning, as long
as their behavior is not constrained by the budget. E±ciency should be close to the
achievable maximum. Towards the end, honesty rates should decline, because subjects
are either constrained if they have spent their budget or have some free budget.
3. Hw(RAN) < Hw(FIX);Hw(RLK); Hw(FIX);Hw(RLK) < Hw(EXO);
E[E](RAN) < E[E](FIX);E[E](RLK); E[E](FIX);E[E](RLK) < E[E](EXO)
In the stable partnerships (FIX) and random links (RLK) treatments honesty rates
should be higher than in RAN as subjects might realize gains from linking decisions
and apply some stochastic conditionally cooperative strategies. Due to coordination
problems and imperfect opportunities for monitoring behavior, honesty should be
lower than in EXO. This should translate into e±ciency higher than in RAN and
lower than in EXO.
4. Hw(CMP) > Hw(RLK); Hs(CMP) < Hs(RLK);
15E[E](CMP) > E[E](RLK):
In the competition treatment (CMP) there are additional incentives to appear honest
as this might attract partners. Hence subjects are expected to state more often a
weak preference than in RLK which di®ers only by the formation of pairs. This has
two consequences. One the one hand, players should be more honest in CMP than in
RLK if they have a weak preference. On the other hand, if they have a longer streak
of strong preferences, they might feel forced to represent their preferences as weak,
i.e. they might \lie down" in order to prevent the impression that they are \lying
up". While the ¯rst e®ect has positive impact on e±ciency, the second has negative
impact. We would expect the ¯rst e®ect to dominate, resulting in higher expected
e±ciency.
4 Results
In the following we ¯rst compare honesty rates in the di®erent experimental treatments.
We will then examine how this translates into di®erences in e±ciency.
4.1 Results - Honesty
The average levels of truthful representation of strong and weak preferences are found in
Tables 5 and 6.
treatment Hw Hs
Random Matching RAN 7.0% 97.2%
Exogenous Budgets EXO 85.7% (88.7%) 84.9% (89.3%)
Table 5: Share of truthfully represented weak and strong preferences for RAN and EXO.
The numbers in parentheses for EXO corrects for forced lies due to a depleted budget (Hs)
or for free lies due to a full budget (Hw).
Let us ¯rst look at the behavior in treatments RAN and EXO (Table 5). As expected,
players in RAN generally state a strong preference, i.e. they misrepresent their preferences
16if they are weak (truthful representation in only 7% of the cases where a weak preference
was observed) but truthfully represent their preferences when they are strong. Indeed 12
out of 24 subjects always state a strong preferences irrespective of their true preference,
another ¯ve always state a strong preference when this is their true preference. Hence
we ¯nd clear support for our ¯rst hypothesis and establish that the incentive problem is
empirically relevant. While this result should not come as a surprise to a theorist, it is
noteworthy that the rates of truthful representation of weak preferences (which can be seen
as a measure of cooperativeness) is lower than cooperation rates that have been observed,
for example, in prisoner's dilemma games with random matching.15
In the treatment with exogenous budgets, the picture is remarkably di®erent. Players
overwhelmingly report their preferences truthfully, supporting our second hypothesis. It is
interesting to note that the rate of truthful representation of strong preferences is substan-
tially lower than in RAN (84.9%). Partly this is due to the fact that the budget becomes
binding for some players in the last few periods, i. e. they are forced to \lie down". Even if
we correct for this, however, the share of truthfully represented strong preferences rises to
only 89.3%. Following statements in the post{experimental questionnaire, some subjects
became worried of spending their budget too fast when they had many strong preferences
in the ¯rst periods and wanted to save their budget for later. Similarly, if we correct for
\free lies", i. e. when players have a su±cient budget to state a strong preference in all the
remaining periods, Hw increases from 85.7% to 88.7%. Overall we ¯nd that the Jackson{
Sonnenschein mechanism works remarkably well as it achieves almost perfectly truthful
revelation (although only 4 out of 24 players always report their preferences truthfully,
even after correcting for forced and free lies). According to a Mann-Whitney test, using the
matching groups as independent observations, aggregating across all pairs and all periods
within each matching group, in EXO Hw is signi¯cantly higher and Hs is signi¯cantly lower
than in RAN (p = 0:1).
We summarize the main results from the baseline treatments in Results 1 and 2.
Result 1 The incentive problem is empirically relevant since in RAN subjects overwhelm-
15Cooper et al. (1996) report cooperation rates of 22% in the last ten periods of a prisoner's dilemma
game with random matching across 20 periods.
17ingly play their dominant strategy to state a strong preference.
Result 2 The Jackson-Sonnenschein mechanism (EXO) achieves a signi¯cant improve-
ment. Stated preferences are overwhelmingly truthful. Subjects partly understate their pref-
erences, either because a depleted budget forces them to do so or because they are afraid of
spending it too quickly.
We now turn to treatments FIX, RLK and CMP (see Table 6), to investigate how well
social interaction can help to overcome the incentive constraints without an exogenously
enforced budget.
treatment Hw Hs
Random Matching RAN 7.0% 97.2%
Exogenous Budgets EXO 85.7% (88.7%) 84.9% (89.3%)
Stable Partnerships FIX 11.6% 97.9%
Random Links RLK 12.8% 98.2%
Competition CMP 30.9% 93.8%
Table 6: Share of truthfully represented weak and strong preferences for FIX, RLK, and
CMP.
The honesty rates in FIX and RLK do not di®er substantially or signi¯cantly from those
in RAN. Essentially, it appears that simply repeated interaction has hardly any e®ect on the
honesty of represented preferences. Thus we do not ¯nd support for our third hypothesis.
In contrast, competition has a notable e®ect on the honesty rates. Weak preferences
are represented honestly in 30.9%, in contrast to 12.8% in the random links treatment.
Hw is signi¯cantly higher in CMP than in RLK, FIX, or RAN (Mann-Whitney, p < 5%,
using aggregate measures for groups of four, ¯xed pairs, or matching groups as independent
observations). Furthermore, strong preferences are represented signi¯cantly less honestly
in CMP than in FIX or RLK (Mann-Whitney, p < 5%) or RAN (p < 10%). That means,
in line with our fourth hypothesis, in CMP players state a weak preference more frequently
than in RAN, FIX, and RLK, both if their true preference is weak and if it is strong.
18Although these di®erences are signi¯cant, they are substantially smaller than the e®ect of
the exogenous budget. In particular, Hw is signi¯cantly smaller and Hs signi¯cantly larger
in CMP than in EXO (Mann-Whitney, p < 5%).
We summarize these observations as follows.
Result 3 Repeated interaction in pairs (treatment FIX) or in groups of four without the
chance of choosing partners (treatment RLK) has essentially no e®ect on honesty rates.
Result 4 If players can choose partners for the interaction (treatment CMP), this signif-
icantly increases the rate of truthfully stated weak preferences and signi¯cantly reduces the
rate of truthfully stated strong preferences compared to treatments RAN, FIX, and RLK.
These e®ects, are however, substantially and signi¯cantly weaker than those induced by the
exogenous budgets (EXO).
4.2 Results - E±ciency
In this section, we report how the di®erent behavior translates into e±ciency di®erences
among the treatments. The expected e±ciency aggregated across all periods is presented
in Table 7 alongside the aggregate across the ¯rst ten periods.
treatment Expected E±ciency Exp. E®. Periods 1-10
Random Matching RAN 52.4% 58.4%
Exogenous Budgets EXO 87.2% (89.1%) 91.2%
Stable Partnerships FIX 55.0% 55.8%
Random Links RLK 55.9% 59.4%
Competition CMP 62.1% 70.3%
Table 7: Expected e±ciency in the di®erent experimental treatments. The number in
parentheses for EXO corrects for forced or free lies due to a depleted or full budget. The
rightmost column shows the expected e±ciency in Periods 1 to 10.
19As we can see, most treatments achieve e±ciency levels only slightly above the stage{
game Nash{equilibrium value of 50%, whereas the exogenous budget treatment almost
reaches full e±ciency. Correcting for the fact that depleted budgets force players to state
weak preferences when their true preferences are strong, about 80% of the possible e±ciency
gains compared to the stage{game Nash{equilibrium are achieved. The expected e±ciency
is signi¯cantly higher than in each of the other treatments (Mann-Whitney tests, p · 10%).
Among the other treatments, only the competition treatment achieves signi¯cantly higher
expected e±ciency than treatments RAN, FIX, and RLK (Mann-Whitney tests, p < 10%).
In no other pair of treatments does expected e±ciency di®er signi¯cantly. Compared to the
di®erence in the rates of truthful representations Hs and Hw, the di®erences in expected
e±ciency between CMP and the other treatments are relatively small. This is so because the
e±ciency gains due to more truthful revelation of weak preferences are partly compensated
by the more frequent misrepresentation of strong preferences. In line with our fourth
hypothesis, however, we ¯nd that the positive e®ect dominates.
In all treatments, there are initially more attempts to cooperate (or also possibly more
errors) such that the expected e±ciency in the ¯rst ten periods is higher than in the overall
data. As shown in Table 7, the e®ect is, however, smaller in FIX and RLK than in RAN and
largest in CMP. As a result, in periods 1 to 10, the di®erence between expected e±ciency
in CMP and in RAN, FIX, and RLK is now signi¯cant even at p < 5% (Mann-Whitney).
Indeed, in all treatments, Hw is higher, but in RAN, FIX and RLK by only 4 to 6 percentage
points, while it reaches 43.5% in CMP (compared to 30.9% across all periods.) Hence the
di®erences between treatments are initially stronger.16
Summarizing our results, we ¯nd clear support for our hypotheses that random matching
without exogenous budgets leads to nearly stage{game Nash{equilibrium play (hypothesis
1) and that exogenous budgets are most e®ective in increasing truthful representation of
weak preferences and e±ciency and that this leads to nearly full e±ciency (hypothesis 2).
We also ¯nd support for the hypothesis that weak preferences are stated more truthfully
and strong preferences less truthfully in CMP than in RLK and that this translates into
higher expected e±ciency (hypothesis 4). Contrary to hypothesis 3, ¯xed matching in pairs
16In all treatments, Hs is marginally smaller in the ¯rst ten periods and in EXO, Hw is marginally higher.
20or groups of four and the possibility of reputation building has a signi¯cant e®ect neither
on honesty rates nor on expected e±ciency. Based on those (partly surprising) results,
in the next section, we try to isolate what drives successful cooperative behavior in our
environment of two sided private information.
5 What Drives Successful Cooperation?
Our above results show that in our experimental setting social interaction has little or no
e®ects on the representation of preferences unless players can choose their partners. At
a ¯rst glance, this appears to be surprising, since in simpler games (like trust games or
prisoner's dilemma games) repeated interaction, like in FIX, usually increases cooperation
substantially. In other experiments, in settings similar to RLK, the opportunity to build
a reputation enables subjects to cooperate (for example in trust games or helping games,
see e. g. Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2003). While we ¯nd that the choice of partners has
a signi¯cant e®ect on e±ciency, they are not as dramatic as, e. g., in the trust game (see
Tyran, Huck, and Ruchala, 2005).
We will now address possible explanations for the observed failure of cooperation in FIX
and RLK and the relatively low e±ciency gain in CMP. Two further treatments will help
us evaluate these explanations. The most plausible reasons are the following:
1. The signals are ambiguous. A player cannot observe whether the other player lied
or not and does not know whether repeatedly stated strong preferences are a true
re°ection of randomly chosen preferences or the result of exaggeration. As a result,
no simple strategy like tit{for{tat in honesty is possible. A conditionally cooperative
strategy can only use stochastic information. This implies the next problem.
2. Players clearly face a coordination problem. Even if they want to play conditionally
cooperative, they have to implicitly agree which horizon is chosen to judge the other's
honesty. That means one player has to know in what cases the other will judge his
behavior as a sign of dishonesty and will revert to punish. Learning the other's strat-
egy (or the others' strategies in RLK and CMP) would take a considerable number of
21periods for experimentation. Put di®erently, while a conditionally cooperative strat-
egy implies a budget for the other player, it is far more di±cult to communicate than
an exogenous budget.
3. Finally, understanding the possible gains from cooperation and understanding that it
is possible to play a conditionally cooperative strategy based on stochastic information
is intellectually relatively demanding and both players (our all four in RLK) must
understand this in order to coordinate on cooperation through mutual honesty.
Note that the last problem is substantially reduced if players can choose each other as in
CMP. Here, if two out of four players understand this, they can choose each other and form
an endogenous cooperating pair. We will discuss below that this is exactly what happens in
several groups and that this drives the observed di®erences in behavior. First, we describe
two control treatments that we ran in order to test explanations number 1 and 2 above.17
Control Treatment I: Fixed pairs with ex post complete information, FXI.
The treatment is identical to \Stable Partnerships" (FIX), except for the fact that,
at the end of each period, in addition to the stated preferences, both players observe
also the true preference that the other player had. This implies that honesty is now
directly observable, so reciprocity does not have to rely on stochastic methods and
there is no need to budget decisions.
Control Treatment II: Fixed pairs with multiple projects per round, F4P.
The treatment is identical to \Stable Partnerships" (FIX), except for the fact that
each pair decided on four independent projects each round. This could enable the
players to overcome the problem of coordinating on a speci¯c conditionally cooperative
strategy and hence on the number of projects that should be linked as it suggests to
link the four projects within each period.18 The payo®s for strong (weak) preferences
17We ran one session with 14 subjects of each treatment. Given the ¯xed matching this yields 7 inde-
pendent observations each.
18Of course, they could in principle still link more decisions across several periods, which would even
further improve e±ciency, but it seems the most obvious choice to coordinate on the projects within a
period as the horizon for the budget.
22where reduced to 20p (10p) in order to compensate for the higher number of projects
and leave hourly wages comparable to the other treatments.
Table 8 relates the honesty rates and expected e±ciency in the two control treatments
to those in the other treatments.
treatment Hw Hs Exp. E±ciency
RAN 7.0% 97.2% 52.4%
EXO 85.7% (88.7%) 84.9% (89.3%) 87.2% (89.1%)
FIX 11.6% 97.9% 55.0%
RLK 12.8% 98.2% 55.9%
CMP 30.9% 93.8% 62.1%
FXI 5.6% 98.8% 52.4%
F4P 19.1% 92.4% 56.6%
Table 8: Share of truthfully represented weak and strong preferences and expected e±ciency
for FXI and F4P.
The ¯rst problem discussed above is in principle eliminated if players can ex{post observe
each others' true preferences. In this case, they can clearly assess each others' honesty and
hence have su±cient information to play simple strategies like tit{for{tat in honesty. Our
control treatment FXI implements such ex{post information. As can be seen from Table
8, however, there is essentially no e®ect of such ex{post information. If anything, it leads
to even more frequently stated strong preferences. As a result, e±ciency is virtually the
same as in FIX. Indeed, pairs are locked even quicker in a \strong{strong" state than in the
other treatments. It appears that some players followed a grim trigger strategy, reverting
to constantly stating strong preferences once they observed the other \lied upwards" only
once. The failure to achieve cooperation in this treatment seems to be driven again by
coordination problems and by slower understanding of some players. Subjects seem to
be impatient and unforgiving. In most treatments, some subjects overestimate their own
honesty and underestimate the honesty of the others. They then punish people for being
dishonest that are not less dishonest than they are themselves. Interestingly, this e®ect
23does not even disappear if subjects can actually judge the other's honesty equally well as
their own.
Concerning reason 2, coordinating on a budget should be facilitated in our second control
treatment F4P where, within a ¯xed pair, players decide about four independent projects
simultaneously in every period. This suggests to assign each other a budget per period,
most likely either two or possibly at most three strong stated preferences. Deviations
from this budget could then be retaliated in the next period(s). Such a strategy could
relatively easy be signaled and would lead already to substantial improvements in truthful
revelation of weak preferences (but would also imply a decrease in the truthful revelation of
strong preferences). While it would further increase truthful revelation if projects were still
linked across periods, this would again be di±cult and hence we would expect short{term
budgeting.
As we can see again from Table 8, there is some increase in Hw compared to RAN or
FIX, but the e®ect is weaker than in CMP. Indeed, the only signi¯cant di®erence is the
comparison of Hw with FXI, but Hw is not signi¯cantly di®erent from CMP. There is also
a notable decrease in Hs, which is, however, still signi¯cantly larger than in EXO, though
only at p < 10%. Since the increase of Hw is partly cancelled by the decrease in Hs, the
increase in e±ciency compared to FIX is very small and insigni¯cant.19
Therefore, it appears that substantially reducing the coordination problem alone does
not enable pairs of players to coordinate on relatively truthful representation of preferences.
Compared to the exogenous budgets, however, reducing the coordination problem comes at
a price in F4P. The design suggests linking four projects and this implies lower e±ciency
gains than linking all 40 projects as in EXO. A reasonable benchmark to compare F4P to
would hence be a treatment where in each period subjects are restricted to a 2{strong{
2{weak{budget. Given the draw of preferences observed in the experiment, if subjects
had been under such a rule and had played the Bayesian Equilibrium strategy to state
preferences as truthfully as possible, we would have observed honesty rates of Hw = 81:0%
19If we again restrict attention to the ¯rst ten periods, we ¯nd expected e±ciency only marginally
increased compared to the complete data, to 52.6% in FXI and to 59.7% in F4P. This is driven by a
larger Hw (29.7% in F4P, 12.3% in FXI), but partly compensated by Hs being marginally smaller in both
treatments.
24and Hs = 79:8%. So even compared to this benchmark, our subjects exaggerate their
preferences quite frequently, but state strong preferences more honestly since they are less
constrained in this respect.
So why do subjects on average represent weak preferences more truthfully in the compe-
tition treatment? The main reason appears to be that the competition treatment reduces
the third, and partly also the second of the above problems. If two out of four players
understand the gains from mutually truthful representation of preferences, they can signal
this by stating some weak preferences. They can then choose each other as partners for
their projects. Hence the third problem is reduced. If two subjects in a group of four see the
way to reap gains from cooperation, this will at least lead them to truthful representation.
We see indeed very clear examples of this kind of endogenous pairing in three of our seven
groups. Interesting is the reaction of the remaining two players. Partly, they also choose
these two players, because the latter state a weak preference more frequently, allowing the
former to gain a higher payo®. In one group, however, the remaining two players choose
each other, but always state a high preference.20
The competition treatment also partly solves the second problem. If a pair forms en-
dogenously, they share two projects each period. Thus they can link these two projects and
hence allow each other to state only one strong preference per period. This is, of course,
far less e®ective than linking a larger number of projects across periods. In particular, it
forces players to state occasionally a weak preference when their true preference is strong.
This explains the lower Hs in CMP.
Another cooperation facilitating property of this treatment is that it allows unambiguous
punishment. In the other treatments, the only way to punish a player is to state a strong
preference in the next interaction with him or her. This, however, is not clearly seen as
punishment since it could also just be the truthful representation of a strong preference. In
CMP, however, once a pair has formed endogenously, one player can punish her partner by
choosing another partner for a limited time.21
20One of these states in the questionnaire, that he considered it unfair to be left out by these two players
and hence started choosing the remaining player, apparently missing the reason why the other two chose
each other.
21One subject stated in the questionnaire, that she followed the strategy to state one{weak{one{strong
256 Conclusion
We have investigated the behavior of experimental subjects in a simple voting game with
private information about the intensity of preferences. We have seen that the exogenously
enforced budgeting mechanism as suggested by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2005) works
very well in inducing players to represent their preferences truthfully. In his list of \Top
Ten Open Research Questions" Camerer (2003) argues that many mechanisms can be cog-
nitively too demanding to work in practice and that \experiments are an e±cient way to
`test-bed' mechanisms and craft good theory" (p. 475). One of the aims of our study was to
provide such a test for the Jackson{Sonnenschein mechanism. We found that in addition to
its theoretical attractiveness, it is easily understood by subjects and hence they reap most
of the available e±ciency gains. Alternative mechanisms such as the Clark-Groves mecha-
nism are cognitively much more demanding which makes it substantially more di±cult for
experimental subjects to reach the levels of e±ciency that they theoretically allow for.
In contrast, various forms of social interaction have produced truthful revelation to a
much smaller degree, if at all. Only if the design suggests a linking of a limited number
of problems in a straightforward way or if players can choose their partners, there is an
e®ect on the honesty rates, which, however, translates into very small e±ciency gains. That
these e±ciency gains are substantially smaller than those achieved by an exogenous budget
does not come as a surprise, as the latter allows subjects to link all decisions, while any
conditionally cooperative strategy can only link a subset of decisions.22 On the one hand,
this shows the strength of the linking mechanism, on the other hand, this makes the latter
a somewhat unfair benchmark for the social interaction treatments.
One might conclude that to arrive at an e±cient outcome in such situations with private
information, a central authority that enforces a budget is required. This might, however,
be a premature conclusion. There are further aspects of social interaction that we have not
investigated, but which might be more important outside the laboratory. For example, if
and if her partner deviated from this rule, she would switch to another partner for one period. The data
shows that she indeed did.
22And this implies that players can more often exaggerate their preferences, but also more often have to
downplay their preferences.
26players had an explicit punishment mechanism available, this might enable them to force
each other to stick to a budget. Another important aspect of social interaction that we
did not investigate here is communication, which could help to overcome the coordination
problem. One might even argue that given that we did not allow for communication the
e®ect of competition alone is rather remarkable.
A further reason for the relatively low achieved level of cooperation is most likely that in
the game we have studied, the outcome in the dominant{strategy equilibrium of the stage
game may not be su±ciently miserable to get the players to try hard enough to overcome
the problem. They have short{term incentives to overstate their preferences and even in
the long run they obtain an acceptable, though ine±cient outcome. We might see more
creative approaches by the subjects if overstating of preferences resulted in zero or negative
payo®s. In the study by Kaplan and Ru²e (2005), for example, the possible e±ciency
gains are substantially larger. This might be one reason why in their experiments subjects
manage quite well to coordinate on e±cient cut{o® strategies.23 While the main result of
Kaplan and Ru²e does not agree with ours, there is an interesting similarity. We ¯nd that
it does not help if ex{post information on true preferences is provided. Kaplan and Ru²e
also ¯nd that this does not improve e±ciency substantially.
To summarize, we observed that private information about preferences makes cooper-
ation di±cult, even in repeated interaction settings that enable subjects in many types of
experiments to reap gains from cooperation. We also saw that the fact that information
remains private ex{post does not appear to be the major problem, since eliminating it
had virtually no e®ect. Instead, the crucial problems appear to be to coordinate on con-
ditionally cooperative strategies if these can be based only on stochastic information and
that it is relatively di±cult for all parties to see the incentives to coordinate. We provide
some evidence that the coordination problem is reduced if subjects decide upon several
problems simultaneously, though this awaits more systematic investigation. Competition
for partners is most e®ective in reducing these problems and enables endogenously formed
pairs to cooperate. Hence competition has bene¯ts beyond those traditionally identi¯ed in
economics.
23Another reason might be that the (private) signal is ¯ner.
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A Payo®s from being honest, tough, and nice


























If both agents always report s or both always report w the decision is always taken by a
°ip of a coin and an agent's payo® would be


















However, deviation from honest behavior is pro¯table. The agent's expected payo® from

































clearly higher than the e±ciency gain from coordination on honest behavior. The expected










































29and hence the relative incentive to lie if the other always states a weak preference is
EU(s;w)¡EU(h;w)
EU(h;w) = 1
5. The expected payo® from always stating a weak preference if the
other always states a strong preference is obviously zero while if the other states prefer-
ences truthfully, it is
EU(w;h) =
1
2
1
2
1
2
2w +
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1
2
1
2
w =
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8
w: (10)
30